· Brown Walrus
SSHole: the OpenSSH bug where two no's make a yes
On November 5, 2026, OpenSSH shipped an emergency fix for a bug its finder, Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield, named "*sshole". On some Linux systems, anyone who sends a long enough password can log in to an account that has no password at all. Attackers were using it within two days, and on November 9 the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added it, as CVE-2026-123158, to its list of flaws under active attack.
Most business systems aren't affected. It takes a particular setup, most often Alpine Linux, a small version of Linux popular for containers and cloud servers. But it's one of the strangest bugs in years, because nobody made an obvious mistake. Four sensible decisions, made by different people over 46 years, lined up to say yes.
46 years in the making
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1980
A star means "no password"
Bill Joy puts a single * in BSD Unix's password file so the daemon account can never take a password.
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Aug 2012
musl says "error" with a star
musl's crypt() starts returning * when it fails, so a failed check can never match a real password.
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musl caps passwords at 256 bytes
Twenty days later, its new SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashing refuses anything longer. Refusing means returning *.
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Jul 2016
OpenSSH makes "no" take longer
To stop attackers timing logins to find real usernames, sshd scrambles passwords even for accounts with no hash, using another account's salt.
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2022
Alpine gives root a star
Alpine 3.16 sets root's password field to * instead of the ! it used after a 2019 security fix.
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Nov 4, 2026
OpenSSH hears about it
Özgün Kültekin's 17,600 test logins find one build that says yes when it shouldn't: musl without PAM.
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Nov 5, 2026
OpenSSH 10.6p2 ships the fix
Alpine publishes fixed packages back to 3.16 the same day. Exploit code is public within hours.
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Nov 7, 2026
00:46 UTC
First confirmed break-in
GreyNoise records a successful attack about 40 hours after the fix.
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Nov 9, 2026
CISA lists it as under attack
U.S. federal agencies get until November 12 to fix it.
Four sensible decisions
1980: a star means "no password." Unix doesn't store your password. It stores a scrambled version, called a hash, and scrambles whatever you type at login to see if the two match. To make an account nobody can log in to with a password, you store something no scramble can ever produce. Bill Joy, building BSD Unix, put a single asterisk (*) there for a system account called daemon. According to the researcher's writeup, the account's description read "the devil himself." A real hash never comes out as one star, so no password matches, and the convention stuck.
2012: musl says "error" with a star. musl is a C library, the base code that programs on Alpine are built on. When its password-scrambling function, crypt(), fails, the rules let it return nothing at all, and programs that don't check for nothing can crash. In August 2012 musl changed crypt() to return something that could never match a real hash instead. It picked the star. Twenty days later, musl added stronger hashing (SHA-256 and SHA-512) with a 256-byte limit on password length, so nobody could tie up a server by sending enormous passwords. Anything longer fails, and failure comes back as *.
2016: OpenSSH makes "no" take longer. Attackers had learned to tell real usernames from fake ones by timing how long a login took to fail (CVE-2016-6210). OpenSSH's fix: when an account has no real hash, sshd, the SSH server, borrows another account's salt (the random bit that goes into each hash) and scrambles your password anyway, so the answer takes as long as a real check. In the researcher's words, "still a no, just a slower no."
2022: Alpine gives root a star. In 2019, Alpine's container images turned out to have an empty root password (CVE-2019-5021), so Alpine locked root with !. That also blocked key-based logins on systems without PAM, the login framework most Linux systems use. So in Alpine 3.16, root got a * instead.
How two no's make a yes
Put the four together on an Alpine server and send a password between 257 and 1,024 characters long for an account whose stored field is *:
- sshd sees no real hash, so it borrows another account's salt and hands your password to musl's crypt().
- The password is over 256 bytes, so crypt() fails and returns
*. - sshd compares that
*with the stored*. They match, and you're in.
To the password file, the star meant "nobody can log in." To musl, it meant "something went wrong." sshd took two no's as a correct password. Alpine's advisory sums it up: "It takes one connection, works every time, and needs no retries."
Most Linux systems never hit it. Debian, Ubuntu and Fedora send logins through PAM, which never asks crypt() about a * account. OpenSSH's own release notes say the root cause lies outside sshd, though the fix went into sshd because that's where people could exploit it.
The way the bug turned up is funny too. Kültekin built sshd every way he could think of (glibc and musl, with and without PAM) and, with a swarm of AI agents, threw about 17,600 odd logins at the builds. Every build gave the same answers except one: musl without PAM, which "said yes to things it shouldn't." His writeup also notes that OpenSSH had reviewed the salt-borrowing code on October 30, four days earlier. The bug sat four lines below it.
Who's affected
All of these have to be true, according to Alpine's advisory:
- OpenSSH on a musl-based Linux. Mostly Alpine. Some Buildroot, Yocto and OpenWrt builds too, though OpenWrt routers normally run a different SSH server, Dropbear.
- No PAM. Alpine's standard openssh-server package is built without it.
- Password logins on. That's OpenSSH's default.
- An account with a star for a password. Its password field is
*. On Alpine 3.16 and later that includes root, users added with adduser without a password, directory users through musl-nscd, and the alpine user in the official tiny-cloud cloud images. - At least one other account with a real password hash for sshd to borrow a salt from.
Root itself is protected by OpenSSH's default PermitRootLogin setting, which refuses password logins for root. The catch is the alpine user in the official cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3: it has a * password field and can become root through doas without a password.
You're not affected if you use Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora or another Linux that uses PAM, if your Alpine containers don't run their own SSH server, or if password logins are already off. Windows PCs and Macs don't use musl.
What to do
- Update. On Alpine, run
apk upgrade -U -a, then restart the SSH server withrc-service sshd restart. Alpine published fixed packages for every release back to 3.16, and 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 include them. Elsewhere, upgrade to OpenSSH 10.6p2 or later. An upgrade without a restart leaves the old server running. - Turn off password logins if you can't update today. Set
PasswordAuthentication no, restart sshd, and check thatsshd -T | grep -i passwordauthenticationreportspasswordauthentication no. Key logins keep working. - Rebuild container images from an updated Alpine base rather than patching running containers.
- Check for break-ins. Look in /var/log/messages for
Accepted password foron an account that has no password. Also look for SSH keys, user accounts and startup services you don't recognise.
Attackers moved quickly
Exploit code was public within hours of the fix. Security firm GreyNoise recorded the first successful break-in at 00:46 UTC on November 7, about 40 hours after the release. So far the attackers seen are mostly botnets and cryptocurrency miners. Once in, they look around, check whether they're inside a container, query the cloud provider's metadata service, and try to read password hashes and root's SSH keys. Some try to add their own SSH keys so they can come back.
CISA gave U.S. federal agencies until November 12 to fix it. Exposed servers deserve the same deadline.
Frequently asked questions
Am I affected if I use Ubuntu, Windows or a Mac?
Almost certainly not. The bug needs OpenSSH on a Linux built on musl, most often Alpine, with PAM turned off. Debian, Ubuntu and Fedora use PAM and a different C library. Windows PCs and Macs don't use musl.
Does a Docker container based on Alpine put me at risk?
Only if the container runs its own SSH server, and most don't. If yours does, rebuild it from an updated Alpine image and turn off password logins.
What's the quickest fix if I can't update today?
Turn off SSH password logins. Set PasswordAuthentication no in the SSH server's settings and restart it. Logins with SSH keys keep working.
Do OpenWrt routers need attention?
Only if someone replaced OpenWrt's usual SSH server, Dropbear, with OpenSSH. Ask whoever set up the router.
How do I know if someone got in?
Look in /var/log/messages for "Accepted password for" on an account that has no password. Also check for SSH keys, user accounts and startup services you don't recognise.
Why is it called *sshole?
The researcher named it, and we'll leave the reading to you. The star at the front is also the character at the heart of the bug.
Not sure what's running SSH on your network?
Routers, cloud servers and containers are easy to lose track of. We can find what's reachable from the internet, patch it and turn off password logins where they don't belong. Call 780-540-7606, or read about our cybersecurity work.